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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 109th Congress adjourned in December 2006 without
passing a federal shield law to protect journalists from subpoenas
seeking the identities of confidential sources. Continued Bush
1
administration opposition to such a law and the crush of other
2
business facing the “lame duck” Congress combined to lead the
3
Senate Judiciary Committee to delay a vote on Senate Bill 2831,
the most recent Senate version of the proposed law, in September
4
2006. The bill never came up for a committee vote in the Senate,
and the House did not even hold a committee hearing on its
5
version of the bill.
As 2006 came to a close, it also appeared unlikely that the
Supreme Court of the United States would soon hear an appeal
from reporters based on a claim that the First Amendment should
afford journalists a privilege. In November 2006, the Court
declined to stay a Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling against
the New York Times that opened the door for the government to
6
subpoena reporters’ phone records to aid a leak investigation.
The Court took the unusual step of voting en banc on the motion,
making it appear highly unlikely that it would grant certiorari to
7
hear an appeal of the Second Circuit’s ruling. The Court also
denied certiorari in June 2006 in the appeals of two reporters
subpoenaed to testify by a former Los Alamos nuclear scientist
1. Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement:
Hearing on S. 2831 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., United States Dep’t of Justice).
2. See Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Wrapping Up Session but Leaving Loose Ends, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A18 (reporting that Congress was preparing to adjourn for
the year without passing several spending measures and other bills).
3. Free Flow of Information Act of 2006, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006).
4. Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Freezes Bill on Legal Protection for Reporters, WASH.
POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at A13.
5. Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006) (denying stay of
New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006)).
7. Adam Liptak, Court Clears Way for Prosecutor to Review Records in Times Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at A20.
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suing the government for leaking private information about him to
8
the media. The scientist, Dr. Wen Ho Lee, claimed that the
9
government violated the Privacy Act of 1974 when investigators
leaked information about him to reporters while he was under
10
investigation for alleged espionage activities. Dr. Lee wanted the
reporters to reveal the names of their sources for stories about him
so he could press his civil suit more effectively. The U.S. Court of
11
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled against four reporters,
while a fifth reporter subpoenaed by Lee lost in his bid to quash
12
the subpoena in a D.C. district court.
The Supreme Court’s decision was predictable given that Dr.
Lee had settled out of court with the government and with the
13
news organizations, thus making the appeal moot. Apparently,
several news organizations paid part of the settlement in order to
ensure that Lee would drop his demand that the reporters be held
14
in contempt. A year earlier, the Court had also declined to review
an appellate judgment against two reporters who hoped to avoid
testifying in front of a grand jury investigating a leak that identified
15
a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative.
Several other
8. Thomas v. Wen Ho Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006); Drogin v. Wen Ho Lee,
126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006) (“No agency shall disclose
any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of
communication to any person, or to another agency” except as required or
specifically allowed by law).
10. Adam Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006, at
A1.
11. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
12. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005).
13. Charles Lane, In Wen Ho Lee Case, a Blow to Journalists After the Fact,
WASH. POST, June 6, 2006, at A3; Liptak, supra note 10, at A1.
14. Lane, supra note 13, at A3; Liptak, supra note 10, at A1.
15. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied sub nom., United States v. Miller, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005). Time reporter
Matthew Cooper and New York Times reporter Judith Miller were found in
contempt for failing to cooperate with the investigation. Id. at 976. Time and
Cooper eventually agreed to cooperate after the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
but Miller did not and was held in contempt of court until the grand jury
disbanded or she testified. See Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name
Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A1. She was freed in September 2005 after her
source released her from her promise of confidentiality. See David Johnston &
Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free from Jail; She Will Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005,
at A1. Miller’s source, I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff,
subsequently was indicted on charges that he lied to investigators in the leak case.
David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Aide Charged with Lying in Leak
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A1. A federal judge later quashed most of
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cases are making their way through the court system, but since the
Court last ruled in 1972 on whether journalists have a First
Amendment right to decline to testify if doing so would identify a
17
confidential source, it has denied certiorari in every similar case
18
that has come its way.
Congress’s inability to bring a shield law to a vote during the
19
2004–06 term, the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to revisit the
question of whether journalists could claim protection from
20
subpoenas under the First Amendment, and a rising tide of
21
adverse lower court decisions do not exhaust all options for
journalists who insist on protecting source identities. If the First
Amendment claim is a non-starter because of the Supreme Court’s
22
1972 opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, and a statutory privilege
remains unavailable at least until sometime during this session of
Congress, there is still a question as to whether journalists enjoy a
federal common law privilege. The Court might be more willing to
hear arguments on a case that tied protection for journalists and
Libby’s subpoenas of the news media for notes and other material for his trial, but
let stand a subpoena for drafts of a Matthew Cooper story about Cooper’s grand
jury appearance. United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2006).
16. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (denying reporters’ motion to quash subpoenas for testimony about sources
for stories about grand jury testimony in regard to steroid use among Major
League Baseball players); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, No. 06-16403,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23315 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006) (denying appeal of freelance
videographer who was held in contempt for refusing to turn over footage from
violent protest in San Francisco to federal grand jury investigating destruction of
police car).
17. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
19. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied sub nom., Thomas v. Wen Ho Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006); Drogin v. Wen Ho
Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d
964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).
21. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (denying appeal of
television reporter who refused to reveal source for surveillance video he obtained
and aired in apparent violation of gag order in public corruption case); McKevitt
v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting existence of journalist’s
privilege in case in which American reporters’ tapes of interviews with prosecution
witness were subpoenaed in a Northern Ireland terrorism trial).
22. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss4/6

4

Fargo and McAdoo: Common Law or Shield Law? How Rule 501 Could Solve the Journalist
4. FARGO, MCADOO - RC.DOC

2007]

4/22/2007 6:15:18 PM

COMMON LAW OR SHIELD LAW?

1351

their sources to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 501 and the
common law, which Rule 501 directs courts to use in the
23
recognition of new privileges. A 1996 Supreme Court case that
recognized a privilege for psychiatric social workers, Jaffee v.
24
Redmond, offers some encouragement for journalists because the
Court’s decision in favor of the privilege relied in large measure on
the fact that the states were unanimous in their support for the
25
privilege. Similarly, the states are nearly unanimous about the
26
existence of a journalist’s privilege. Asking the Supreme Court,
however, to recognize a common-law journalist’s privilege also
carries risks, in large part because journalists, unlike the social
workers in Jaffee, are not licensed by the government, making it
difficult to define a class of persons to whom the privilege would
apply.
This article will examine the pros and cons of pinning the
hopes of journalists who want to protect sources without risking
punishment for contempt of court on a federal common-law
privilege. Part II of this article will briefly discuss the history of the
journalist’s privilege after 1972 and discuss the extent to which
federal and state courts have relied upon the common law in
protecting journalists and their sources. In Part III, the article will
examine FRE 501, which was created in 1975, three years after
Branzburg was decided, and which forms the basis for federal
privilege law in the last thirty years. In Part IV, the article will
analyze the Jaffee decision and other federal court decisions arising
from FRE 501. Part V will discuss factors that weigh in favor of
recognizing a common-law journalist’s privilege based on FRE 501
and court decisions interpreting it. Part VI will discuss the pitfalls
of relying upon common law to clear up the muddle that federal
journalist’s privilege law has become. Part VII will analyze the pros
and cons of a common-law journalist’s privilege and will contrast
them with the statutory protection that would be provided by the
various shield bills introduced in the 109th Congress.
II. JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE LAW SINCE 1972
27

In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court rejected, by a 5–4
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

FED. R. EVID. 501.
518 U.S. 1 (1996).
Id. at 12–13.
See infra Part II.A.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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vote, the position of three reporters that the First Amendment
shielded them from testifying before grand juries investigating
28
crimes. While acknowledging that newsgathering needed “some”
First Amendment protection to keep freedom of expression from
29
being “eviscerated,” the Court was unwilling to burden the lower
30
courts with a voyage toward an “uncertain destination.”
That
uncertainty, the Court said, would be a natural result of forcing
lower courts to do a case-by-case analysis of whether subpoenas
31
directed at reporters should be enforced. The Court noted that a
qualified privilege would also hinder a grand jury’s efforts to find
32
the truth and bring criminals to justice. The majority also found
no basis for granting journalists a right that other citizens did not
33
enjoy when called to provide relevant evidence to a grand jury.
In what has turned out to be a pivotal concurring opinion,
however, Justice Lewis Powell felt it necessary to emphasize the
34
narrowness of the majority opinion. While the majority opinion
found that journalists had no First Amendment right to refuse to
testify to grand juries when they had witnessed crimes or received
confessions and the grand juries were investigating specific crimes,
28. Branzburg was a consolidation of four cases involving three reporters who
had declined to reveal confidential sources to grand juries. Paul Branzburg of the
Louisville, Kentucky Courier-Journal had been subpoenaed by two grand juries in
that state after he wrote stories about drug dealers and users. Id. at 667–70.
Kentucky’s highest court twice rejected his attempts to quash the subpoenas,
finding that the state shield law did not apply to eyewitness accounts of criminal
activity. See Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Pound,
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970). Paul Pappas, a New England television reporter, spent
several hours with members of the Black Panthers in their headquarters in New
Bedford, Massachusetts, after a racial disturbance in that city but never filed a
story. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672. Nevertheless, he was subpoenaed by a grand jury
investigating Black Panther activities, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found that he was not protected by any state common-law privilege. Id. at
673–74; see also In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971). Earl Caldwell, a New
York Times reporter based in California, was subpoenaed by a grand jury
investigating the Black Panthers, whose national headquarters was in Oakland.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1970). Caldwell regularly
covered the group’s activities. Id. In Caldwell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit eventually ruled in his favor, finding that he should not have to
appear before the grand jury because of a First Amendment privilege. Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 679; see also Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1086.
29. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
30. Id. at 703.
31. Id. at 703–05.
32. Id. at 686–90.
33. Id. at 703–05.
34. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Powell said that if a journalist was harassed or her testimony
would have no relevance to the investigation, she could seek relief
35
in the courts.
Justice Potter Stewart, joined by Justices William Brennan and
36
Thurgood Marshall, filed a dissent. According to the dissent, in
order to protect the free flow of information to the public and to
keep reporters from being “annexed” as government
37
investigators, the government should have to show that it had a
compelling need for a journalist’s information; that the
information was relevant to the case; and that the information was
38
not available elsewhere. In a separate dissent, Justice William O.
Douglas argued that journalists should enjoy an absolute privilege
39
protecting them from government subpoenas.
The Court’s majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
largely focused on whether journalists had any First Amendment
right to refuse to cooperate with otherwise valid grand jury
investigations. The majority noted vaguely that newsgathering had
40
“some” First Amendment protection, but not to the extent of
excusing journalists from the duties demanded of all citizens to
41
The
provide relevant evidence to criminal investigations.
dissenters suggested that denying journalists the First Amendment
right to protect the identities of confidential sources would lead to
an infringement of free expression. Justice Stewart’s dissent
constructed a logical syllogism: if there was no privilege, at least
some sources with information important to the public interest
would refuse to share it with reporters. If that happened, stories
based on that information would never be published and the free
flow of information to the public would be cut off, literally, at the
42
source.
Justice Douglas, in arguing for a virtually absolute
privilege, focused on the chilling effect that a lack of privilege
would have on both sources and journalists, decreasing the press’s
43
ability to check abuses of government power.
Both dissenting opinions alluded to or foreshadowed various
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 709–10.
Id. at 725–52 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 725.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 712–13 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 681 (majority opinion).
Id. at 690.
Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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theories about freedom of speech and the press that were popular
in the second half of the twentieth century. Justice Stewart’s
concern for the free flow of information to the public suggested
44
traces of both Alexander Meiklejohn’s self-government theory and
its corollary: the idea that the press and public have a “right to
45
know.” Meiklejohn is famous for suggesting that free speech and
self-government are inexorably linked because so many decisions in
a democracy require wise voters to make wise decisions, which can
only happen if voters are fully aware of all the pros and cons
46
regarding public issues and public officials. The “right-to-know”
corollary suggests that the press needs access to government-held
information so that it can inform the public of what its government
47
is doing.
Both the Stewart and Douglas dissents, with their emphases on
preserving press autonomy so that the press can act as a check on
government power, foreshadowed Professor Vincent Blasi’s
48
“checking value” theory. A few years after Branzburg, Blasi argued
that a primary purpose of the First Amendment’s speech, press,
assembly, and petition clauses is to provide the press and public
49
with the means to check government power. The link between
the Branzburg dissents and Blasi’s theory is clearer in light of a
speech made by Justice Stewart in 1974, shortly after the Watergate
scandal led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation. Justice
Stewart argued that the press should properly be thought of as a
“Fourth Estate” with a distinct institutional role as a watchdog over
50
the three official branches of government. He did not suggest
that the press should therefore always win its battles with
government over access or privilege issues, but rather argued that
51
the press clause gave the press the right to challenge government.
While much of the pro-privilege argument shows up in the
Branzburg dissents, either directly or as subtext, it is worthwhile to
44. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 3 (1948).
45. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know:
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1.
46. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 44, at 26–27.
47. See generally Emerson, supra note 45; see also KENT COOPER, THE RIGHT TO
KNOW 16–17 (1956).
48. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521.
49. Id.
50. Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
51. Id. at 636.
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note that the majority opinion did not leave the press entirely
helpless. Justice Byron White, writing for himself and on behalf of
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis
Powell, and William Rehnquist, noted that Congress was free to
create a statutory journalist’s privilege and the states were free to
52
do likewise. The Court also noted that state courts were free to
interpret their own constitutions as they saw fit to recognize such a
53
privilege.
Largely missing from the discussion of any possible basis for a
journalist’s privilege was mention of whether a privilege might be
recognized at common law. In at least three instances, Justice
White’s majority opinion cited the lack of any recognition of a
journalist’s privilege in common law to support the majority’s view
54
that such a privilege is not favored or necessary. There was no
suggestion that one possible source of relief for journalists could be
a privilege recognized at common law, but neither was there a
direct statement barring such a privilege.
A. State Privilege Law
In subsequent years, protections for journalists and their
sources have come in a variety of forms in both state and federal
jurisdictions. At present, thirty-one states and the District of
55
Columbia provide statutory protection to journalists, while New
52. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 685 (“At common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the
existence of any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential
information to a grand jury.”); id. at 693 (“The available data indicate that some
newsmen rely a great deal on confidential sources and that some informants are
particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is held by
this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to subpoenas, but the
evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the
flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and
constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.”); id. at 698
(“As noted previously, the common law recognized no such privilege, and the
constitutional argument was not even asserted until 1958.”).
55. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2005); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–.390 (2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003 & Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510
(2005); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995 & Supp. 2007); COLO REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-119 (2005 & Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (Lexis 2007); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (1999 & Supp. 2006); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to
-4704 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1999 & Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30
(1995 & Supp. 2006); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-901 to -909 (2003 & Supp. 2006);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-46-4-1 to -2 (1999 & Supp. 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.100 (West 2005); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. arts. 1451–1459 (West 1999 & Supp.
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56

Mexico accomplishes the same thing with a formal court rule.
Although the degree of protection varies considerably, it is safe to
say that all of the statutes, or “shield laws,” provide at least qualified
protection to journalists seeking to protect the identities of
confidential sources. About two-thirds of the statutes also protect a
journalist’s work product, such as unpublished photographs, notes,
57
audio tapes, or video outtakes.
In the eighteen states without shield laws, most recognize
58
either a constitutional privilege or a common-law privilege.
59
60
Utah,
and
Appellate courts in three states—Mississippi,
Wyoming—have not considered the question. Hawaii appellate
courts have not considered the question since eleven years before
61
Branzburg was decided.
Texas appellate courts have found no

2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 767.5a (2000 & Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–.025 (2006); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1999); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.275 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.13 (West 1994 & Supp.
2006); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-53.11 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2739.04, .12 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1993 & Supp. 2007); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–.540 (2003 & Supp. 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1997 & Supp. 2006);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000 &
Supp. 2006).
56. N.M. RULES ANN. § 11-514 (2005).
57. See supra note 55, with regard to statutes in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
58. See, e.g., In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985) (state and
federal constitutions); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977) (state
constitution); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978) (federal constitution);
Sinnott v. Boston Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988) (common law); State ex
rel. Classic III, Inc., v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (federal
constitution); Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) (state
constitution); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974) (federal constitution);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974) (federal constitution); Senear
v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1978) (common law); Zelenka v.
State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978) (state and federal constitutions).
59. But see JAMES C. GOODALE, 3 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2006, at 1085–86
(PRACTISING L. INST., ed. 2006) (noting that Mississippi trial courts had recognized
a qualified journalist’s privilege in unreported cases).
60. But see Edward L. Carter, Note and Comment, Reporter’s Privilege in Utah,
18 BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (2003) (discussing trial court decisions in Utah that have
recognized a journalist’s privilege grounded in the First Amendment).
61. In re Goodfader’s Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw. 1961) (rejecting journalist’s
attempt to quash subpoena).
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privilege exists when reporters are subpoenaed in criminal cases.
63
In civil cases, the law in that state is unclear. Several of the states
without shield laws have extended the journalist’s privilege to cover
64
nonconfidential material, while others have specifically rejected
65
that extension.
Among the states without shield laws, Massachusetts and
Washington have been the most direct in attributing journalists’
protection to the common law, while most other states have cited
66
state or federal constitutional concerns.
In 1985, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declined a task force
recommendation that it adopt a press shield as a court rule, saying
that it preferred to allow protections for the media to develop
67
through precedent.
The court said that the evolution of a
journalist’s privilege through common-law development would be
more likely to be “flexible enough” to maintain a proper balance
between the public interest in free expression and fair adjudication
68
than adoption of a rule. The court noted that “[t]he common law
process will result in less static and dogmatic principles” than would
69
be likely with a court-adopted rule.
In subsequent cases, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized a common-law,
70
qualified journalist’s privilege in several cases.
62. Burnette v. State, No. 01-00-00403-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3944 (Tex.
App. June 14, 2001); Coleman v. State, 966 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(en banc); State ex rel. Healey v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994).
63. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Co., 6 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding
television station could not claim a privilege for nonconfidential outtakes of video
shot at scene of accident and subpoenaed in civil case but leaving open question
of whether confidential information would be privileged in similar circumstances).
64. See Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1987); Lamberto v.
Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1982); State ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass’n v. Ranson,
488 S.E.2d 5 (W. Va. 1997); State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va.
1989); Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 538 N.W.2d 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
65. See State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1996); In re Letellier, 578 A.2d
722 (Me. 1990); State v. Hohler, 543 A.2d 364 (Me. 1988); Comm. v. Corsetti, 438
N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1982); CBS Inc. (KMOX-TV) v. Campbell, 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982).
66. See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information
in States Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 258–64 (2002).
67. Promulgation of Rules Regarding the Protection of Confidential News
Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 156 (1985).
68. Id. at 158.
69. Id.
70. Comm. v. Tam S. Bui, 645 N.E.2d 689 (Mass. 1995); In re John Doe Grand
Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991); Sinnott v. Boston Ret. Bd., 524
N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988). But see Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d
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In 1982, the Washington Supreme Court recognized a
71
common-law journalist’s privilege and provided a relatively
72
detailed roadmap of how it reached its decision. In Senear v. Daily
73
Journal-American, the Washington Supreme Court first noted that a
journalist’s privilege was not favored in the common law. The
court cited evidence law scholar John Henry Wigmore for the
proposition that any privilege established by a court of law must
meet four conditions:
(1) The communication must originate in a confidence
that it will not be disclosed; (2) the element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the
relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communication must be greater than the benefit
74
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
The court concluded that the first two conditions existed in
75
regard to a journalist’s privilege. As for the third condition, the
court said that, while it might not have existed in earlier times, “it
76
does exist with considerable force today.” The court said that the
complex nature of modern society, the need for an informed
citizenry, and “the increasing importance of journalists to convey
information to citizens” meant that the relationship between
journalists and sources was one that should be “sedulously
77
fostered.”
As for Wigmore’s fourth condition, the court spent
little time determining that, with respect to civil litigation at least,
the injury from failing to establish the privilege would be greater
78
than any benefits from requiring reporters to testify.
Later, the court reflected upon the nature of the common law.
It is not, the court said, a set of unchanging doctrines:
667 (Mass. 2005) (upholding default judgments against newspaper and reporter
for refusing to reveal confidential source to plaintiff in libel and privacy action),
cert. denied by Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 126 S. Ct. 397 (2005).
71. Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180, 1180 (Wash. 1982).
72. Id. at 1181–84.
73. Id., 641 P.2d 1180.
74. Id. at 1182 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
75. Id. at 1183.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Haugland v. Smythe, 169 P.2d 706 (Wash. 1946)).
78. Id. at 1183.
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It is a living, vital body of law which should address the
problems of the day. When long standing rules of court
and the administration of justice no longer have merit,
they should be changed. The flexibility of the common
law allows the law, by the action of the court, to change.
All of the conditions we have held necessary for
establishing a common law qualified privilege exist. The
79
time has come to change and we do so.
It should be noted, however, that this was not a unanimous
decision. One justice on the Washington Supreme Court argued
that the court should have recognized a privilege grounded in the
80
First Amendment. Two justices dissented, arguing that if such a
81
privilege were to be created, it was up to the legislature to do so.
The difference of opinion on the Washington Supreme Court is a
microcosm of the difference of opinion generally about the origins
of the journalist’s privilege.
B. Federal Privilege Law
By contrast to the two states that have specifically adopted
common-law journalist’s privileges, federal courts that have alluded
to a common-law journalist’s privilege have been largely silent on
how and why they determined its origins. Most federal appellate
courts have found that a privilege protecting journalists from
82
revealing confidential sources exists. Most of those courts have
grounded the journalist’s privilege in the First Amendment, but
others have suggested that the privilege is a creation of common
83
law.
Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
rejected the existence of any type of journalist’s privilege in federal
84
law. The Seventh Circuit more recently rejected the existence of a
privilege covering work product and questioned other courts’
finding of a privilege for confidential material but did not decide
79. Id. at 1184 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 1184–85 (Utter, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 1185 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc., v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583
(1st Cir. 1980); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Riley v. City of
Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 780 F.2d
1134 (4th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.
1980); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
84. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987).
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85

that question.
The Second, Third, and Ninth circuits have
recognized a privilege that extends to work product in certain
86
situations, while the Fifth, in addition to the Sixth and Seventh,
87
has rejected such an extension.
Particularly in the federal system, it may be folly to attempt to
treat constitutional and common-law privileges as separate entities.
Common law is often described as “judge-made law” that is created
88
by case decisions and extended through precedent. That is also a
fairly accurate description of the way constitutional law develops.
In fact, some commentators have suggested that the Constitution is
largely a product of common-law thinking, particularly in the way
89
that it describes judicial power in Article III. For the moment, at
least, it is useful to note that whatever similarities exist in commonlaw and constitutional law decision making do not necessarily mean
that both are equal as sources of law.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has been the
most direct and specific federal appellate court in grounding a
90
journalist’s privilege in common law. In Riley v. City of Chester, a
Third Circuit panel determined that a lower court erred in finding
a reporter in contempt for refusing to reveal her sources to a
91
plaintiff in a civil action in which the reporter was not a party.
The decision came only a few years after the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, including FRE 501 regarding
92
privileges. The court in Riley determined that FRE 501’s guidance
to courts to act in regard to “reason and experience” in developing
93
privilege law should initially lead to the First Amendment. The
court determined that Branzburg’s suggestion that the First
94
Amendment protected newsgathering and the obvious links
between effective newsgathering, confidential sources, and an

85. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
86. See Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Corp., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999); Shoen v.
Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139,
146–47 (3d Cir. 1980).
87. United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).
88. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 10 (2003).
89. Id. at 18–19.
90. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
91. See id.
92. See infra Part III.
93. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979).
94. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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informed public weighed in favor of the privilege. The court also
noted that, while it did not have to follow state law in a federalquestion case, it could not ignore the Pennsylvania public policy
96
decision to create a shield law. The court determined that the
strong public policy supporting “the unfettered communication to
the public of information, comment and opinion” and the First
Amendment aspects of the policy led it to recognize a qualified
97
journalist’s privilege.
A year later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
cited Riley approvingly in finding that a lower court needed to
revise its formula for determining whether a libel defendant
98
newspaper must disclose confidential sources to the plaintiff. The
court said that the resolution of the dispute did not “lie in any
black letter pronouncement or broad scale confrontation between
99
First Amendment and reputation interests.” This would seem to
suggest that with no statutory guidance and no need to resort to a
constitutional showdown, the answer to the privilege question lay in
the common law. But the court then suggested that the proper
solution to the issue at hand would be an application of federal civil
procedure rules coupled with a “heightened sensitivity” to First
100
Amendment implications of compelling disclosure.
While this
might be characterized as a common-law approach, it would appear
to more closely resemble a constitutional-law approach.
Two other circuits have alluded to the common law as the basis
of a journalist’s privilege, one prior to the adoption of FRE 501 in
1975 and the other immediately after. In the 1972 case Baker v.
101
F & F Investment, the Second Circuit ruled in favor of a reporter
trying to avoid discovery of his confidential sources in a civil rights
102
The panel seemed to
lawsuit in which he was not a party.
anticipate FRE 501 when it said that federal courts, absent a
statutory journalist’s privilege, should look to judicial precedent
(experience) and “a well-informed judgment as to the proper

95. Riley, 612 F.2d at 714–15.
96. Id. at 715 (citing In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1963), and alluding to
42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1976)).
97. Id.
98. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (1st
Cir. 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
102. See id.
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federal public policy” affecting each case (reason).
The court
also noted approvingly that the trial judge considered the public
policy of New York, where the reporter lived, and Illinois, the
forum state for the underlying civil rights action, both of which had
104
adopted statutory journalist’s privileges. But later in the opinion,
the court closely ties the privilege to the First Amendment rather
105
than the common law.
106
In the 1975 case Lewis v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held
that a reporter could not withhold evidence from a federal grand
107
jury investigating crimes.
The court determined that Branzburg
would make it difficult, at best, to argue for a common-law privilege
108
that would protect a reporter subpoenaed by a grand jury.
In short, journalists have found limited protection for their
sources—and themselves—in a hodge-podge of constitutional,
statutory, and common-law locations. In the federal system,
however, the constitutional protection is uneven and the statutory
109
Could the common law of
protection is unavailable so far.
evidence provide a basis for a more consistent federal privilege
recognized by the Supreme Court? Perhaps, but first, the Court
would have to determine the meaning of FRE 501 in this context.
III. RULE 501
American journalists have been arguing for about as long as
there have been reporters that they should not have to reveal their
110
sources. That history is relatively short compared to the length of
time that judges in England and the United States have required
people with relevant evidence to provide it to courts of law.
103. See id. at 781.
104. Id. at 781–82.
105. Id. at 785. “It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our
constitutional way of life, that where the press remains free so too will a people
remain free. Freedom of the press may be stifled by direct or, more subtly, by
indirect restraints. Happily, the First Amendment tolerates neither . . . .” Id.
106. 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 238.
109. See infra notes 384–399 and accompanying text (regarding proposed
federal shield law).
110. See Aaron David Gordon, Protection of News Sources: The History and
Legal Status of the Newsman’s Privilege (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin) (on file with Herman B. Wells Library, Indiana
University) (tracing instances of journalists resisting subpoenas back to the mid1800s).
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Wigmore writes that the English tradition of compelling witnesses
dates to at least 1742, when apparently the question of whether
recalcitrant witnesses could be forced to testify became a matter of
111
public debate.
Wigmore quotes Lord Hardwicke as saying in
Parliament “that the public has a right to every [person’s]
112
evidence.”
There also is a long history of people trying to escape the
obligation to provide evidence for professional or personal reasons.
Wigmore noted that until the practice was effectively outlawed in
the eighteenth century, British courts often excused as witnesses
people who claimed they had “obligations of honor” to keep
113
confidences. In both England and this country, efforts have been
made for many years through statutes and common-law
development to balance the needs of courts and recalcitrant
witnesses through privileges. Wigmore, after stating his four-part
114
test for the recognition of privileges, also expressed a disdain for
most privileges created by statute or common law as impediments
115
to the discovery of truth through litigation.
But over time, privileges have developed through common
and statutory law in all or most states to protect relationships
116
between medical doctors and patients,
psychotherapists and
117
118
patients, and, in a few states, even accountants and clients, in
addition to the widely recognized privileges for attorneys and
119
120
121
clients, clergy and penitents, and spouses.
Given the conflict between the need for evidence and the ways
in which privileges have developed, it is perhaps not surprising that
one commentator has said that “[t]he law of evidence in the
United States is probably the most complex, maddening, and rule122
There is probably a great deal of
bound in the entire world.”
truth to that, but Congress made an attempt to bring order to
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
(2002).

8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp. 2005).
Id.
Id. § 2286.
Id. § 2285.
Id. § 2286.
Id. §§ 2380–2391.
Id.
Id. § 2286.
Id. §§ 2290–2329.
Id. §§ 2394–2396.
Id. §§ 2332–2341.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 266
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chaos by codifying federal evidence rules in 1975.
FRE 501, on
privileges, states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
124
accordance with State law.
As Edward J. Imwinkelried noted in summarizing the history of
125
FRE 501, it was the result of a political compromise in Congress.
FRE 501 replaced a set of specific rules regarding privilege that
were in the text of a Supreme Court Advisory Committee report
that raised Congress’s concern in the midst of the Watergate
126
scandal, which drew attention to executive privilege issues.
In
providing a more open-ended framework for privilege law, FRE 501
gives federal courts the power to define the boundaries of privilege
law but “is devoid of even a suggestion as to how the courts are to
127
exercise that power.”
According to Imwinkelried, the text of FRE 501 leaves open
the possibility that courts will interpret the rule to either foreclose
the development or expansion of privileges or encourage such
128
development or expansion.
Imwinkelried contends that the
context of FRE 501, among other evidence rules that favor
admission of evidence, argues against both interpretations and
toward an interpretation of FRE 501 that would allow new or
expanded privileges, but only after a very cautious analysis by the

123. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L. No.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
124. FED. R. EVID. 501.
125. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual
Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 514 (1994).
126. Id. at 512–14.
127. Id. at 515.
128. Id. at 524, 529–30.
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129

court.
FRE 501 is not without its critics, many of whom have
suggested that it maintains a status quo full of “confusion and
130
frustration” and fails to establish a “procedural methodology” or
“substantive policy” for the courts with regard to analyzing privilege
131
claims.
Federal appellate case law since FRE 501’s adoption
would seem to bear out Imwinkelried’s observation that there are
at least two ways to interpret FRE 501: restrictively and
132
expansively.
129. Id. at 542–43.
130. See Kenneth R. Tucker, Note, Did Congress Err in Failing to Set Forth Codified
Rules Governing Privileged Relationships and Resulting Communications?, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 181, 204–06 (1994).
131. See M. Leigh Svetanics, Note, Beyond “Reason and Experience:” The Supreme
Court Adopts a Broad Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 41 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 719, 720 (1997).
132. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005)
(finding that governor’s chief legal counsel could claim attorney-client privilege in
connection to criminal investigation of governor); In re Sealed Case (Med.
Records), 381 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (vacating district court discovery order
until that court determines whether records of man committed to state care
contain privileged mental-health files); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923
(7th Cir. 2004) (declining to create privilege for medical records at common law
but finding that privacy interests outweigh government’s interest in late-term
abortion records); United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that trial court erred in allowing defendant’s psychiatrist to testify and declining to
create “dangerous patient” exception to psychotherapist-patient privilege, but
finding that error was harmless because defendant was acquitted on charge
relevant to psychiatrist’s testimony); United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788 (8th Cir.
2003) (finding that spousal privilege did not prevent defendant’s wife from
voluntarily testifying against defendant); United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th
Cir. 2000) (finding there is no “dangerous patient” exception to federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege and affirming lower court’s quashing of
subpoena for psychiatrist); Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining
to recognize “novel” privileges that would protect agency records about juveniles
even though such privileges were part of state law); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Violette), 183 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that psychotherapist-patient
privilege should be construed to contain “crime-fraud exception” and affirming
lower court order to have psychiatrists testify to grand jury); In re Medtronic, Inc.,
184 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that federal law protecting records of
pacemaker manufacturer that identify patients did not illegally create a new
privilege); United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that
Alcoholics Anonymous telephone operators were not privileged in
communications with defendant); In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that White House counsel cannot claim attorney-client privilege in
relation to criminal investigation of government officials); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that White House
may not claim attorney-client privilege in regard to grand jury investigation of
government officials); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Scarce), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir.
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IV. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF FRE 501
By and large, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create
new privileges under FRE 501, but it also has not rushed to limit
privileges already recognized. So, for example, in University of
133
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the
Court declined to create a privilege for colleges’ peer review
134
materials related to faculty tenure decisions.
The Court said it
was “disinclined” to exercise its FRE 501 authority “expansively”
and suggested that the creation of the privilege that the university
135
sought was a “legislative function.”
This opinion seems to be in
line with an earlier decision declining to recognize a “legislative
136
acts” privilege for a state legislator accused of misusing his office.
In that decision, the Court took note of the legislative history of
FRE 501 and stated that no one had suggested the kind of privilege
the legislator sought before the specific privilege recommendations
137
were abandoned in favor of FRE 501.
While this fact was not
dispositive, the Court said, it did highlight the fact that the
legislative function test “was not thought to be either indelibly
138
ensconced in our common law or an imperative of federalism.”
But when a privilege was “ensconced in our common law,” the
Court was reluctant to let it be nibbled upon. In a 1998 case,
139
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Court determined that the
140
attorney-client privilege should survive the death of the client. It
turned back an attempt by an independent counsel to pierce the
shield around Clinton aide Vince Foster’s conversation with his
141
attorney nine days before Foster’s suicide. The Court noted that
the attorney-client privilege is “one of the oldest recognized
privileges in the law” and that it was being asked to narrow it in a
1993) (declining to recognize common-law “scholar’s privilege” for student
subpoenaed by grand jury); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dtd. Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d
223 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding that spouse could voluntarily testify against husband without violating
husband’s rights as long as testimony was limited to observations and not
communication).
133. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 189.
136. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
137. Id. at 367–68.
138. Id.
139. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 401–03.
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142

way contrary to case law. FRE 501 did not require that a privilege
must exist untouched for all time once it was created, the Court
said, but it did require a stronger showing than the Independent
143
Counsel had made to overturn it.
Given the Court’s embrace of custom and tradition in other
privilege cases since the adoption of FRE 501, it is not easy to
144
explain the Court’s ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond.
But Jaffee offers
perhaps the best hope for journalists wanting to persuade the
Supreme Court to recognize a common-law privilege.
A. Jaffee v. Redmond
In 1996, the Supreme Court crafted a test that could be
utilized by the federal courts to create federal common-law
145
privileges. The test requires an analysis of the importance of the
public and private interests served by the privilege, measured
against the public interest in forcing disclosure of evidence, and
consideration of the extent to which the states had adopted a
146
similar privilege through common or statutory law. The majority
held “that confidential communications between a licensed
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or
treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501
147
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” The case, however, dealt with
counseling sessions with a state licensed social worker and not a
148
licensed psychotherapist.
In expanding the privilege to cover the licensed social worker,
the Court looked at several factors to determine whether the
149
privilege served important private and public interests. First, the
Court found it important that social workers provided a significant
150
portion of the mental health services in the United States.
Secondly, it was significant that the services provided by social
151
Finally,
workers serve the same public goals as psychotherapists.
the fact that a majority of states had provided privilege protection
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 410.
Id. at 410–11.
518 U.S. 1 (1996).
Id. at 9–14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 15–16.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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to licensed social workers within the framework of the
psychotherapist privilege was another factor that weighed in favor
152
of recognizing a privilege under FRE 501.
Interwoven in the
Court’s dialogue on the extension of the privilege to licensed social
153
If the Court limited the
workers was an economic argument.
privilege to psychotherapists, then the protection for those seeking
or needing counseling would be limited to those who could afford
the services of the psychotherapists, thereby excluding large
154
portions of society from the benefits of the privilege.
155
The
The Court rejected the lower court’s balancing test.
Court was very concerned with the negative impact that such a test
156
could have in application. In particular, the Court wanted those
who sought counseling to be able to predict that their statements
made in confidence would be excluded from federal proceedings
157
without being subject to the whims of judges.
Thus, the Court
held that a near-absolute privilege would be recognized to promote
158
certainty in the application of the privilege.
Outside of the holding and these two clarifications, the Court
did not see a need to fully define the parameters of the new
159
privilege. The Court did throw in one significant piece of dictum
160
for future courts to decipher.
In footnote nineteen, the Court
seemed to envision a dangerous patient exception to the near161
As for future privileges
absolute privilege that it had created.
created under the auspices of Jaffee, the Court stated that it would
be better to allow the courts creating the new privileges on a caseby-case basis to shape the details of the privilege in a similar
162
manner.
The dissent in Jaffee, written by Justice Antonin Scalia,
demonstrated a reluctance to create new privileges because of the

152. Id. at 16–17.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 17.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 17–18.
158. Id. “An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all.” Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
159. Id. at 18.
160. Id. at 18 n.19.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 18.
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163

public’s need for evidence.
The dissent was very critical of the
majority opinion’s terse extension of the psychotherapist privilege
164
to licensed social workers. Justice Scalia likened this extension to
an extension of the attorney-client privilege to accountants or tax
165
advisors. He was very uncomfortable with the level of training of
social workers when compared with either psychotherapists or
166
lawyers.
B. Jaffee’s Progeny in the Lower Courts
The lower federal courts have utilized the Jaffee framework in a
variety of ways. Some courts have taken an expansive view of the
privilege and provided protection to counselors outside of the
scope of the original Jaffee ruling. Other courts have been stricter
when applying a psychotherapist privilege. Generally, what the
majority in Jaffee envisioned would happen has occurred: further
clarification and definition in the lower courts on a case-by-case
basis.
1.

Who Qualifies for the Psychotherapist Privilege

The privilege created in Jaffee extended to licensed
167
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers. One aspect of the
scope of the privilege left unanswered by the Jaffee Court was who
else might be covered by the psychotherapist privilege. Numerous
subsequent cases have been litigated to help further define the
168
scope of coverage for this privilege.
a.

Marriage Counselors

The district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin curtly
extended the psychotherapist privilege to include marriage

163. See id. at 18–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 20.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 28–30.
167. Id. at 15 (majority opinion).
168. See Oleszko v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 243 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998); Jane Student 1 v.
Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Ala. 2002); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino,
82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2000); EEOC v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan
Sisters, No. 96-C-1428, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 1997); Greet
v. Zagrocki, No. CIV. A. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1996).
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169

counselors.
The case involved a suit brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of a
woman who claimed that she was discriminated against because of
170
her race.
The defendant employer sought discovery of the
marriage counseling records of the woman and her husband to
counter any claims that the woman’s discharge was to blame for her
171
marital problems.
The court, with no discussion, declared that
the marriage counseling records of the couple fell under the
172
umbrella of the privilege created in Jaffee.
b.

Employee Assistance Programs

As a result of the Jaffee decision, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1996 vacated an order that had
forced disclosure of an Employee Assistance Program’s (EAP) files
pertaining to a police officer whose department was being sued
173
because of the officer’s actions.
The court, and not the police
officer (who was not represented at the hearing), asserted the
privilege and categorized it as a psychotherapist privilege on its
174
own.
The party opposing the motion to compel did not specify
175
which privilege was the basis for its objection. The court focused
on the sensitive nature of the counseling provided by the EAP and,
with barely any discussion, lumped the EAP in with the
176
psychotherapist privilege.
In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Oleszko
177
v. State Compensation Insurance Fund further elaborated upon the
178
Specifically, the court
extension of the privilege to EAPs.
answered the question of whether or not the privilege extends to
179
unlicensed counselors of an EAP.
In deciding this question, the
180
court looked to Jaffee for guidance.
169. See St. Michael Hosp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847, at *7.
170. Id. at *1.
171. Id. at *7.
172. Id. Although the court found that the records could be protected under
the psychotherapist privilege, the privilege would have to be waived if the EEOC
were to seek damages for harm to the woman’s marriage. Id.
173. Greet, 1996 WL 724933, at *1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. 243 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. See id. at 1157–59.
179. Id. at 1157.
180. Id. at 1156–57.
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EAPs, in the court’s ruling, served the same public and private
interests as social workers and therefore, using the same rationale,
181
should be encompassed in the privilege. In particular, the court
focused upon the “gateway” role that EAPs play in the treatment of
182
To allow the documents and personnel of
mental health issues.
an EAP to be used in a courtroom would be to permit an end run
around the privilege whenever an individual begins treatment with
183
an EAP instead of directly with a psychotherapist.
In allowing the protection by privilege of communications with
unlicensed employees of EAPs, the court distinguished the
historical background of EAPs from the social workers involved in
184
Jaffee.
EAPs were a rapidly growing area of the mental health
185
field and as such were only beginning to be licensed by the states.
The court declined to penalize the clients of EAPs simply because
186
EAPs are relative newcomers in the mental health field.
c.

Licensed vs. Unlicensed Counselors

The Oleszko court’s discussion of licensed versus unlicensed
counselors in the EAP setting was not the only court opinion to
weigh in on the issue of licenses and their impact on the existence
187
188
of a privilege.
In United States v. Lowe, the court ruled that
communications with a rape counselor had some form of federal
189
But the Lowe court did not
privilege in light of the Jaffee ruling.
explore the parameters of such a privilege because it was
190
unnecessary in the case before it.
191
The Speaker v. County of San Bernardino case in 2000 provided
192
an additional wrinkle to the licensure debate.
In the case, a
licensed marriage, family, and child counselor (MFCC) met with a

181. Id. at 1157–58.
182. Id. at 1159.
183. Id. at 1158.
184. Id. at 1158 n.5.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1158.
187. See Jane Student 1 v. Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306, 309–10 (S.D. Ala. 2002);
United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1996).
188. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97.
189. Id. at 99.
190. Id. at 100 (holding that whatever privilege existed was limitedly waived by
the client for in camera review by the court).
191. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
192. Id.
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San Bernardino police officer following a shooting incident. The
department arranged the sessions for the officer as part of its
194
mandatory follow-up to a shooting incident.
The department
195
told the officer that the sessions were confidential.
The court began by ruling that because the type of counseling
performed was outside the scope of the license of the counselor,
196
the communications were not covered by the Jaffee privilege.
Instead of focusing on this aspect of the case, the court turned to
the understanding of the officer, who believed that the
197
communications in question were confidential.
The court ruled
that the officer’s communications with the counselor were
privileged because the officer reasonably believed that he was
198
speaking to a licensed psychotherapist. To support its ruling, the
court looked to similar situations dealing with the attorney-client
199
privilege, both in courts and in scholarly literature.
Courts have not always been so lenient in applying the
200
None of the
psychotherapist privilege to unlicensed counselors.
courts previously mentioned in this section made reference to the
oft quoted, “these exceptions to the demand for every man’s
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they
201
are in derogation of the search for truth.”
In Jane Student 1 v.
202
Williams, the court acknowledged this as a “bedrock principle of
203
It was through this lens, rather than
American jurisprudence.”
the more permissive perspectives of previous courts, that the Jane
Student 1 court rejected the application of the privilege to
204
communications with an unlicensed counselor.
Another rejected extension of the psychotherapist privilege
205
involved volunteers from Alcoholics Anonymous.
A criminal
193. Id. at 1107.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1110–11.
197. Id. at 1112.
198. Id. at 1114.
199. Id. at 1112–13.
200. See United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the defendant’s statements to volunteers working at the office of an
association for alcoholics were not protected by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege).
201. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
202. 206 F.R.D. 306 (S.D. Ala. 2002).
203. Id. at 309.
204. Id. at 310.
205. See Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 657.
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defendant sought to exclude testimony from the volunteers on the
grounds that the communications were protected under the
206
privilege.
The court rejected that argument based on numerous
207
The volunteers had no professional
considerations.
qualifications, did not behave in such a manner that they could be
confused with a psychotherapist, did not work in an office that
suggested that they provided mental health services, and did not
speak with the defendant “for the purposes of diagnosis or
208
treatment.”
Taken as a whole, the unlicensed volunteers in this
situation did not qualify under any expansive definition of
209
psychotherapists.
2.

Exceptions

In addition to further clarifying who is eligible for protection
under the federal psychotherapist privilege, the courts have also
imported exceptions to the privilege from other, more established
privileges such as the attorney-client privilege. The crime-fraud
exception has been applied to the psychotherapist privilege in at
least one circuit. Despite a near endorsement by the Supreme
Court in Jaffee, there is a split among the federal circuits regarding
the application of a dangerous patient exception.
a.

Crime-Fraud Exception

Although the Jaffee court did not envision a qualified privilege,
it did endorse the idea that exceptions to the privilege might be
210
In 1999, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
necessary.
borrowed the crime-fraud exception from the attorney-client
211
privilege and applied it to the psychotherapist privilege.
The
exception applied “[o]nly when communications are intended
directly to advance a particular criminal or fraudulent endeavor
212
. . . .”
In order to invoke the privilege, the party seeking its use

206. Id. at 656.
207. Id. at 656–57.
208. Id. at 657.
209. Id. at 656–57.
210. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
211. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 76–77 (1st Cir.
1999). The case involved a grand jury investigation into multiple crimes including
bank fraud. Violette spoke with two psychotherapists “as part of a scheme to
defraud lenders and/or disability insurers.” Id. at 78.
212. Id. at 77.
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was required to make a prima facie showing that the exception
213
should be applied.
b.

Dangerous Patient Exception

In a footnote, the Jaffee court also seemed to open the door for
a dangerous patient exception, but there is a split in the circuits as
214
215
In United States v. Glass, the Tenth Circuit
to its existence.
created a dangerous patient exception when it ruled that an
evidentiary hearing would be required to evaluate the seriousness
of the threat and the necessity of the disclosure to avoid the
216
harm.
217
Other courts have not followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead.
In
218
United States v. Hayes, the Sixth Circuit stated that, although
psychotherapists may disclose the existence of threats to third
parties and testify at involuntary hospitalization proceedings, they
did not have a duty to testify at either criminal or civil
219
proceedings.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected a dangerous
220
221
patient exception in United States v. Chase in 2003.
213. Id. at 78.
214. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19. Footnote nineteen reads:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future
developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt
that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for
example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.
Id.
215. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
216. Id. at 1357. In the Glass case, Glass voluntarily sought mental health
treatment from a psychotherapist. Id. During the treatment, Glass expressed a
desire to shoot President Clinton and Hilary Clinton. Id. Glass was released from
the facility upon the promise to continue outpatient treatment while living with
his father. Id. When Glass moved out of his father’s home ten days after being
released, the doctor contacted local authorities who in turn contacted the Secret
Service. Id. Glass was indicted for threatening the President, and the doctor’s
testimony was sought in connection with proving the threat. Id.
217. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000).
218. 227 F.3d 578.
219. Id. at 586. In Hayes, the government sought the testimony of a treating
psychotherapist who had heard threats toward a federal official in the course of
the treatment of Hayes. Id. at 583. The government, after the psychotherapist
had disclosed the threat to a person at risk, brought charges against Hayes for
threatening a federal official. Id. at 580–81.
220. 340 F.3d 978.
221. Id. at 992. In Chase, the defendant was treated by a psychiatrist for a
variety of mental health ailments. Id. at 979. In the course of treatment, the
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Other Privileges

The federal district courts have also not been shy in utilizing
FRE 501 and the Jaffee framework to create new privileges. With
the purpose of facilitating fair resolutions to conflicts between
opposing parties, courts have recognized the need to create both a
mediation privilege and a settlement privilege.
These new
privileges were more rooted in public policy than in the consensus
among states as to their existence.
a.

Mediation Privilege
222

In Folb v. Motion Picture Industries Pension and Health Plans, a
federal district court created a federal mediation privilege using
223
Like the Jaffee Court, the Folb court started
the Jaffee framework.
224
from the basic tenet that privileges should not be lightly created.
The Folb court utilized the Jaffee test to evaluate the legitimacy of a
225
federal mediation privilege. After applying the test to the facts of
the case, the court ruled that a federal mediation privilege did
226
exist.
The court followed the lead of Jaffee in creating the scope of
227
the privilege, as well.
The court declined to create a limited
228
The
privilege that required a balancing test for application.
privilege protected communications revealed as part of a formal
229
mediation with a neutral mediator.
This included
communications with the mediator, whether before or during the
defendant revealed to the psychiatrist a list of people whom the defendant had
thought about harming that included two FBI agents with whom the defendant
had dealings. Id. After speaking with her supervisor and legal counsel for her
institution, the psychiatrist contacted the local police, who in turn contacted the
FBI. Id. at 980. The defendant was charged with three counts, including
threatening to kill the agents. Id. at 981.
222. 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
223. Id. at 1170–80.
224. Id. at 1171.
225. Id. Under this formulation, the court must ask:
(1) whether the asserted privilege is ‘rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust[;]’(2) whether the privilege would serve public
ends; (3) whether the evidentiary detriment caused by exercise of the
privilege is modest; and (4) whether denial of the federal privilege would
frustrate a parallel privilege adopted by the states.
Id. (citation omitted).
226. Id. at 1179–80.
227. Id. at 1180.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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proceeding, and communications with the other party during the
230
It did not include negotiations outside of the
mediation.
231
mediation between the parties.
In the 2000 case of Sheldone v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
232
the District Court for the Western District of
Commission,
Pennsylvania followed the lead of Folb and recognized a federal
233
mediation privilege.
In defining the scope of the privilege, the
234
Communications
court first looked to the District’s local rules.
related to a mediation proceeding involving a neutral were
235
protected.
The limitation placed on the privilege by the court
was that evidence that was independently discoverable would still
be discoverable even though it was used as part of a mediation
236
proceeding.
In 2002, a U.S. bankruptcy court provided some specific
examples of items protected by the mediation privilege as well as
237
one significant exception. The court protected slides created for
the mediation proceeding, memoranda of law presented to the
neutral, as well as other memoranda submitted during the
proceedings and correspondence between the parties and the
238
mediator.
The court drew the line, however, at materials
239
prepared “well in advance of the mediation.”
b.

Settlement Privilege

In 2003, the Sixth Circuit recognized a settlement privilege
240
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles
under FRE 501 and Jaffee.
241
Power Supply, Inc., the court sought to answer the question of
whether a litigant could compel discovery of settlement negotiation
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 104 F. Supp. 2d 511 (W.D. Penn. 2000).
233. Id. at 517.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing W. Dist. Local R. 16.3.5(E), 16.3.1).
236. Id.
237. See In re RDM Sports Group Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2002).
238. Id.
239. Id. The court provided no guidance on what “well in advance of the
mediation” meant. See id. The excluded documents, however, were ones that had
been disclosed to opposing counsel prior to the mediation. Id. at 422.
240. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d
976, 979–81 (6th Cir. 2003).
241. Id.
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communications from another related case involving his or her
242
The court used an abbreviated Jaffee analysis in its
opponent.
decision that focused on the public interest promoted by the
privilege and the history in the circuit of confidentiality of
243
communications during settlement.
The overriding concern of the court was the public policy
244
issues that might arise if the privilege was not recognized.
In
particular, the court was concerned with the possible impairment
of settlement negotiations if the communications within them were
245
not considered confidential.
In addition, the court called into
question the veracity and reliability of statements made during
246
settlement discussions.
The scope of the privilege was simply
247
“any communications made in furtherance of settlement.”
C. Summary of Analogous Case Law
The Jaffee court explicitly rejected a qualified privilege for
psychotherapists that would require a balancing test component in
248
order for the privilege to be exercised. Instead, the Court crafted
a privilege that provided a level of certainty in its protection of
249
communications made to psychotherapists.
Although the
privilege was not absolute in the pure sense of the word, it was
250
broad. The rule was that “confidential communications between
a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of
251
diagnosis or treatment are protected.”
The rule was quickly expanded upon in the Jaffee opinion to
252
include licensed social workers.
Subsequent courts have further
expanded the protected class covered by the Jaffee rule to include
marriage counselors, EAPs, unlicensed rape counselors, and
counselors whom the recipient of the services reasonably believed
253
would qualify for the Jaffee privilege.
Other courts have rejected
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 979.
Id. at 980–81
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 983.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996).
Id. at 17–18.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–17.
See Oleszko v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 243 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)
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the application of Jaffee to unlicensed mental health practitioners
254
and Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers. The scope of what type of
practitioners communications can be with for purposes of the
psychotherapist privilege is still an open question that has seen
255
some courts be very permissive in interpretation.
Lower courts have also developed exceptions to the
256
privilege.
One court has imported the crime-fraud exception
from the attorney-client privilege, while others have debated the
existence of a dangerous patient exception despite a near
257
endorsement of such an exception by the Supreme Court.
Courts have also created new privileges under the Jaffee
framework, including a federal mediation privilege and a federal
258
settlement privilege.
The mediation privilege protects
communications related to proceedings before a neutral
259
mediator.
It does not protect subsequent communications nor
does it protect communications that were prepared too far ahead
260
of the time of the proceedings. Similarly, the settlement privilege
protects communications made by parties when trying to resolve
261
their dispute.
The settlement privilege, however, has a less
formal feel because it does not require a formal proceeding to be

(EAPs); Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1114 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (person reasonably believes privilege applies); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, No. 96-C-1428997,
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11847 at *7 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 1997) (marriage counselors);
United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1996) (unlicensed rape
counselors); Greet v. Zagrocki, No. 96-2300, 1996 WL 724933, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
16, 1996) (EAPs).
254. See United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Alcoholics Anonymous volunteers); Jane Student 1 v. Williams, 206 F.R.D. 306,
310 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (unlicensed mental health practitioners).
255. See sources cited supra note 253.
256. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir.
1999); United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).
257. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (dangerouspatient); United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000) (dangerouspatient); Violette, 183 F.3d at 78 (crime-fraud); Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
258. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d
976, 977 (6th Cir. 2003) (settlement privilege); Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 104
F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Penn. 2000) (mediation privilege); Folb v. Motion
Picture Indus. Pension and Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–80 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (mediation privilege); In re RDM Sports Group Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 430
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (mediation privilege).
259. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
260. Id.
261. Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 977.
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262

V. FACTORS FAVORING A COMMON-LAW JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE
For journalists, Jaffee and its progeny offer hope because of the
courts’ embrace of state law as a guideline for federal privileges.
One factor favoring a common-law journalist’s privilege is the fact
that nearly all of the states have recognized some sort of journalist’s
privilege by statute or by court ruling. As noted earlier, thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia provide statutory or court-rule
protection to journalists, and most of the other states recognize a
263
common-law or constitutional privilege.
While the degree of
protection varies considerably, it is safe to say that all of the states
that recognize some form of journalist’s privilege provide at least
qualified protection to journalists seeking to protect the identities
264
of confidential sources.
Federal law is not as helpful to journalists as state law, but the
federal split on the privilege’s existence, extent, and origin may
work to journalists’ advantage. In Jaffee, the Court noted that one
reason for accepting the case was the fact that the federal appellate
courts were split on whether such a privilege should be
265
recognized.
Given the widespread recognition of at least a qualified
privilege for confidential material among the states and the conflict
among federal appellate courts, journalists’ case for a common-law
privilege could be attractive to the Supreme Court under FRE 501
and Jaffee. Although lower courts have split in various directions in
their interpretations of Jaffee, that decision has certainly not
prevented lower courts from recognizing new privileges or
extending Jaffee to related professionals.
As noted earlier, some federal appellate courts already have
suggested that the common law is a source of protection for
266
journalists.
A more recent federal district court decision,
although it did not stand up on appeal, still provides fodder for
arguments in support of a common-law journalist’s privilege.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
See supra Part II.A.
See id.
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996).
See supra Part II.B.
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A. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales
In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit overturned a Southern District of New York ruling that had
protected the phone records of a pair of New York Times journalists
based upon both a constitutional and federal common-law
267
journalist’s privilege. The Circuit Court’s basis for overruling the
district court was that whatever privilege may have existed under
the federal common law was overcome by the factual circumstances
268
of the case.
The Supreme Court declined to stay the Circuit
269
Court’s ruling. Despite the ruling of the Circuit Court and the
Supreme Court’s denial of a stay, the district court’s opinion
provides a good model for lawyers or judges who are seeking the
recognition of a federal common-law journalist’s privilege,
particularly because the Second Circuit panel did not rule out the
270
existence of a common-law privilege.
In this case, the New York Times sought a declaratory judgment
for protection of the telephone records of two Times reporters from
271
subpoena by a federal special prosecutor. The special prosecutor
was seeking the records as part of a grand jury investigation into
leaks by government officials to the two reporters of upcoming
272
raids on two Islamic charities suspected of aiding terrorists.
The
Times claimed that both the First Amendment and the federal
common law protected the conversations of its reporters with
273
confidential sources from disclosure to the grand jury.
In order to decide whether the First Amendment protected
the New York Times, the district court looked first to the one
274
Supreme Court case on the topic, Branzburg. The New York Times
court noted that this somewhat fractured opinion has resulted in a
variety of interpretations of the decision by both courts and
275
academics.
Because of this variety of interpretations, the district
court looked to the jurisprudence of its own circuit for the
direction it should take in answering the question of whether the
267. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’g 382
F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), stay denied, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006).
268. N.Y. Times, 459 F.3d at 170.
269. N.Y. Times, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006).
270. See N.Y. Times, 459 F.3d at 163.
271. N.Y. Times, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
272. Id. at 466–68.
273. Id. at 467.
274. Id. at 484; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655 (1972).
275. N.Y. Times, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 485–86.
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New York Times and its reporters had a First Amendment claim of
276
The district court
protection from the grand jury subpoena.
found that in the Second Circuit there is a qualified First
277
Amendment journalist’s privilege based upon Branzburg.
As its common-law argument, the New York Times advocated the
creation of a journalist’s privilege under FRE 501 using the test
278
fashioned by the Supreme Court in Jaffee.
The district court
ruled that there was a qualified federal common-law journalist’s
279
privilege under FRE 501 using the Jaffee test.
What is most
curious about the holding of the district court regarding the
federal common-law journalist’s privilege is that the privilege was
280
qualified.
The Jaffee Court created a non-qualified privilege in
order to provide a level of certainty to those who might need its
281
The district court chose a more uncertain path by
protection.
recognizing a qualified privilege. The Second Circuit panel in New
York Times noted that it agreed with the district court that any
282
common-law journalist’s privilege would be qualified.
283
The New York Times district court used the Petroleum Products
test to determine if the New York Times was eligible for protection
under a combined First Amendment and federal common-law
284
journalist’s privilege.
The Petroleum Products test required the
government to make “a clear and specific showing that the
information is: highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to
the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other
285
available sources.” This test is part of the line of Second Circuit,
286
There is no mention of common-law
Branzburg-related cases.
privilege cases and their scope as a potential source in New York
276. Id. at 486–90.
277. Id. at 490.
278. Id. at 492. The Jaffee test, as utilized in New York Times, is comprised of
three factors: (1) would the privilege serve significant private interests, (2) would
the privilege serve important public interests, and (3) would the significant private
and public interests served by a privilege outweigh the evidentiary benefit if no
privilege existed? Id. at 497–505. A fourth variable that could be used to support
the creation of a privilege is the consensus of the States upon the existence of the
privilege. Id.
279. Id. at 508.
280. Id. at 501.
281. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996).
282. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2006).
283. In re Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982).
284. N.Y. Times, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
285. Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d at 7.
286. See id. at 7–8.
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Times for defining the journalist’s privilege recognized by the court.
It is worth noting that there was no unanimity on the Second
Circuit panel that ultimately reversed the district court. In dissent,
Judge Robert Sack wrote that he had “no doubt” that a commonlaw journalist’s privilege had developed under FRE 501 since
287
Branzburg was decided.
Judge Sack suggested that a qualified
journalist’s privilege seemed “easily—even obviously—to meet” the
Jaffee factors for recognition of a privilege: the serving of private
and public interests that outweighed the evidentiary benefit of
288
rejecting the privilege, and widespread recognition by the states.
Other recent decisions also are notable for leaving a door
open for a common-law privilege. For example, a federal district
court in California refused to quash grand jury subpoenas for two
San Francisco Chronicle reporters who published information from
secret grand jury transcripts related to an investigation of steroid
289
use in baseball.
The court found that Branzburg required it to
reject recognition of a common-law privilege in the grand jury
290
context, but in the next sentence the court also said that even if it
291
did recognize a privilege, it would be overcome in this case. This
suggests that the court still felt the need to go through a qualified
privilege analysis even as it rejected the existence of the privilege in
292
the case’s particular fact situation. In the Judith Miller case, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals judges agreed that
Miller should be forced to testify to a grand jury investigating the
293
public revelation of a CIA agent’s identity. The judges, however,
disagreed on the existence of a privilege. One judge dismissed the
existence of a common-law privilege and suggested that the
294
creation of such a privilege was a strictly legislative function.
Another suggested that a common-law privilege might exist, but it
295
was not necessary to determine that to decide this case.
The
third would recognize a common-law privilege that would require a
showing of need, exhaustion of alternative sources, and a balancing
of the public interest in disclosing the journalist’s source versus the
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

N.Y. Times, 459 F.3d at 181 (Sack, J., dissenting).
Id.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at 1119.
Id.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 968.
Id. at 981 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
Id. at 984 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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public interest in the reporter exposing the information to the
296
public.
If a court recognized that there was a common-law journalist’s
privilege, but not a First Amendment based privilege, where should
the court look for guidance in defining the scope of the commonlaw privilege? In the era following the Jaffee decision, could Jaffee
and its progeny provide some guidance to the courts in defining
the scope of a common-law journalist’s privilege?
B. Application of Analogous Case Law to a Journalist’s Privilege
Reporters in cases such as Branzburg and New York Times have
sought protection from revealing their sources for news stories to
grand juries, be it directly or through related information. The
communication itself is not confidential, since the reporter
typically publishes it. The identity of the source, however, is the
real confidential communication. This is different than the
psychotherapist, mediation, or settlement communication where
the identities of the parties are known, but the statements made
and documents used are held in confidence and protected by
privilege under FRE 501. If a lawyer wished to argue for a FRE 501
journalist’s privilege independent of Branzburg, however, Jaffee and
its progeny would provide analogous case law for helping shape the
scope of the privilege.
In following Jaffee, the communications between the reporter
and the source must be confidential. The communication must be
in the course of the private and public justifications for allowing
the privilege—in the case of reporters, the collection of
information in order to distribute it for public consumption.
The most problematic aspect of the application of a
journalist’s privilege would be determining who qualifies for the
privilege. The psychotherapist privilege has resulted in numerous
cases and divisions in circuits as to who is covered, and the
psychotherapist privilege does not have the same type of First
Amendment concerns that creating a protected class for journalists
297
would have.
If a court were to utilize a Jaffee-style analysis of the
scope of a journalist’s privilege, the precedent would imply that the
296. Id. at 997–98 (Tatel, J., concurring).
297. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704–05 (1972) (suggesting that
recognition of a journalist’s privilege would actually create a First Amendment
conflict because courts would have to limit its reach to some speakers and not
others).
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court should evaluate the application of the privilege on a case-bycase basis, just as the Supreme Court did in Jaffee and lower courts
have done in subsequent cases. Post-Branzburg case law, however,
would be useful here. Circuit courts have developed a test for
determining who may claim protection of a journalist’s privilege by
looking at the intent of the potential witness at the time the
information being sought was gathered. In general, the circuits
that have confronted the issue have determined that a “journalist”
is someone engaged in investigative reporting who had the intent,
at the time the disputed information was gathered, of
298
disseminating it to the public.
The importation of the crime-fraud exception and the
dangerous patient exception into a journalist’s privilege would be
realistic possibilities. These exceptions did not originate as part of
the psychotherapist privilege but instead were borrowed from
other, already existing privileges. The justifications for having
these exceptions most likely would carry over into a FRE 501
journalist’s privilege. A court could also decide to do as the Jaffee
Court did and leave the creation of exceptions to the lower courts
in subsequent cases.
The mediation and settlement privileges could provide a
backdrop for an expansive perception of a journalist’s privilege.
Both privileges protect communications and documents that were
part of the protected proceedings and negotiations. It could
therefore be argued that any communications and documents
related to the confidential source could be protected so long as it is
not done too far ahead of time.
While the Jaffee and the New York Times rulings both provide
some hope to journalists in regard to the creation of a federal
common-law privilege, other factors weigh against a common-law
privilege, as the next section will discuss.

298. See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim of talkshow host that he could seek protection under journalist’s privilege); Shoen v.
Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that nonfiction book author qualified
for protection under journalist’s privilege); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136
(2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim of book author for privilege protection because
information was not gathered for purpose of dissemination but for personal
reasons).
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VI. FACTORS WEIGHING AGAINST A COMMON-LAW JOURNALIST’S
PRIVILEGE
If the Jaffee ruling gives hope to journalists that the Supreme
Court would rule in their favor based on state support for the
privilege and a desire to resolve a circuit split, it also creates
obstacles.
The Court noted in Jaffee that its decision to uphold the
psychotherapist privilege was reinforced by the fact that the
committee whose recommendations led to FRE 501 originally had
proposed that the psychotherapist privilege be among nine specific
299
privileges recognized in federal law. As a recent commentator
noted, a journalist’s privilege was not among the nine specific
300
privileges recommended before FRE 501 was adopted.
For that
reason, the commentator said that FRE 501 would have to be
amended to include a journalist’s privilege, because no such
common-law privilege could be recognized by a federal court
301
under the existing rule.
But the district court in New York Times
did not see the non-inclusion of the journalist’s privilege in the
original draft of FRE 501 as a bar to the recognition of such a
302
privilege.
While it may not be necessary to amend FRE 501 to gain
recognition of a journalist’s privilege, there are other significant
hurdles for journalists. For one thing, it is not clear that the Jaffee
opinion is more than an aberration from the Court’s general policy
on privileges. One commentator has called the Court’s “strong
303
assertion” of the privilege “peculiar,” while another has said the
Court “merely paid lip-service” to common-law principles in its
304
decision.
Another critic was milder, calling the decision
“questionable,” but also finding one part of the decision potentially
305
This was the part of the Court’s analysis that also
dangerous.
299. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1996).
300. Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and
Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 492 (2002).
301. Id. at 447–48, 500.
302. New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
303. Molly Rebecca Bryson, Note, Protecting Confidential Communications Between
a Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 998–99
(1997).
304. Svetanics, supra note 131, at 753.
305. Rule 501—Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 110 HARV. L. REV. 287, 287
(1996).
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caused the greatest consternation for Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Jaffee but would be very helpful for the press: the reliance on state
action. Justice Scalia’s dissent attacked the majority for recognizing
a new federal privilege that was created not by state common law
306
but, in most states, by statute.
Justice Scalia argued that the fact
that the states had enacted a psychotherapist privilege by statute
indicated that the matter did not “lend itself to judicial treatment”
307
but to the flexibility of legislation. It should be noted that among
all of the states that recognize some form of journalist’s privilege,
thirty-two (plus the District of Columbia) do so through statutes or
308
a formal court rule.
Even assuming that Justice Scalia’s dissent, which was joined by
only one other justice, would carry little weight in another privilege
case, the fact remains that showing that nearly all of the states
recognize a privilege would solve only half of a journalist’s
problem. Widespread state support for the privilege might indicate
that “experience” is on journalists’ side (coupled with uneven
support for a privilege in the federal appellate courts). But what
about “reason”?
A major blow to journalists’ cause before the Supreme Court
likely would come from an analysis of reason. For starters, the
Court has consistently said that the press clause of the First
Amendment confers no special privileges on the institutional
309
media.
This line of precedent would make it exceedingly
difficult to persuade the Court to find a constitutional or commonlaw basis for a journalist’s privilege.
As noted earlier, one factor that could weigh against Supreme
Court recognition of a common-law journalist’s privilege is the fact
that the committee that recommended nine specific privileges for
recognition prior to the adoption of Rule 501 did not include a
306. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 26.
308. See supra notes 55–56.
309. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (finding
that First Amendment does not immunize press from lawsuits under doctrine of
promissory estoppel for breaking promise of confidentiality to source); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169–70 (1979) (finding that First Amendment does not
prevent libel plaintiff from inquiring into editorial process in order to show actual
malice); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (finding that press has no
extraordinary rights to photograph or tape conditions inside county jail); Saxbe v.
Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 847 (1974) (finding press has no extraordinary rights to
demand that it be allowed to interview specific prisoners in federal penal facility);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same, with regard to state prisons).
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310

journalist’s privilege on the list.
While this in itself may not be
fatal to journalists’ hopes, it should be noted that the Court in Jaffee
did rely in part on the fact that a psychotherapist privilege was on
311
the list to reinforce its recognition of the privilege in that case.
The list also did not include a privilege for social workers, but it
would be easier for the Court to extend a psychotherapist privilege
to social workers performing similar tasks than it would be for the
Court to recognize a journalist’s privilege that has no similar tie to
an existing privilege.
The largest obstacle for journalists, however, comes from a
major
difference
between
journalists
and
the
Jaffee
psychotherapists. In Jaffee, the Court was dealing with professionals
who are licensed by states to provide specific services. Journalists
are not licensed, and there is no clear definition of who may claim
the title “journalist.” In fact, the Supreme Court in Branzburg
suggested that even attempting to define a class of persons who
could claim protection under a judicially recognized journalist’s
312
privilege would raise First Amendment concerns.
The Court’s
majority opinion said that defining a class of privileged “journalists”
would lead to severe problems for the courts in trying to distinguish
between members of the institutional press and authors, lecturers,
and educators who perform a similar function of informing the
313
Any attempt to persuade the Court
public on important issues.
to recognize a common-law privilege would inevitably lead to a
similar problem of defining to whom it applied.
In short, there are factors in privilege law that weigh both for
and against Supreme Court recognition of a common-law
journalist’s privilege. Where does that leave journalists and those
who support their desire for a privilege so they can protect sensitive
sources while avoiding legal sanctions?
VII. ANALYSIS: COMMON LAW OR SHIELD LAW?
The two years leading up to the writing of this article have not
been good times for journalists seeking to avoid identifying
confidential sources. In December 2004, a Rhode Island television
reporter, James Taricani, was sentenced to six months of house

310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text.
See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704–05 (1972).
Id.
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arrest for criminal contempt after defying a judge’s order to reveal
314
Taricani had obtained from the source an FBI tape
his source.
showing a Providence, Rhode Island, city official apparently taking
315
a bribe from an informant.
The tape was evidence in a pending
criminal trial and was covered by a gag order issued by the
316
presiding judge.
Taricani was released early from his sentence
317
for good behavior. Taricani’s source revealed himself before the
reporter was sentenced and later was convicted of criminal
contempt, disbarred, and ordered to serve up to eighteen months
318
in prison.
In July 2005, Judith Miller of the New York Times entered a
319
federal prison in Virginia to serve a sentence for civil contempt.
A federal grand jury subpoenaed Miller to learn the identity of a
source or sources within the Bush administration who might have
320
identified an undercover CIA operative to reporters.
The
operative, Valerie Plame Wilson, is married to Joseph Wilson IV, a
former ambassador who has criticized the Bush administration’s
321
efforts to justify going to war with Iraq. Wilson wrote an opinion
piece for the Times in 2003 claiming that he had disproved a rumor
about Saddam Hussein’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons that
322
the administration had relied upon to justify war.
Shortly after
his article appeared, columnist Robert Novak reported that
Wilson’s wife, a CIA operative identified to him by two
administration officials, had recommended Wilson for the CIA323
sponsored mission to investigate the rumor.
The motive for the
leak is not entirely clear. Either the administration was attempting
to discredit Wilson by suggesting that his investigation was really a
314. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 27, In re Special Proceeding, No.
01-47 (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/opinions/
torres/12092004_1-01msc0047t_sentencing.pdf.
315. In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47, 32 Media L. Rep. 1075
(D.R.I. 2003).
316. Id.
317. Pam Belluck, Reporter Granted Release from Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, April 7,
2005, at A21.
318. Mike Stanton & W. Zachary Malinowski, Bevilacqua Gets 18 Months for
Leaking Tape, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 10, 2005, at A1.
319. See Liptak, supra note 15.
320. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
321. See id. at 966.
322. Joseph C. Wilson, IV, What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003,
§ 4 (Magazine), at 9.
323. Robert Novak, Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, at A21.
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junket arranged by his wife, or it was trying to get back at Wilson by
324
damaging his wife’s career. What is clear is that it is illegal, under
certain circumstances, to reveal the identity of an undercover CIA
325
operative to people not authorized to possess such information.
Several reporters who were known to have received the same
information that Novak received eventually testified to the grand
326
jury investigating whether the leak violated federal law.
Miller,
however, refused to testify until she was sure her source had
released her from her promise of confidentiality and until she
received assurances from Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald that
327
Miller left jail in late
he would not ask her about other sources.
September 2005 after eighty-five days and testified to the grand jury
328
after both conditions were met.
A month later, the grand jury
indicted I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s
chief of staff and Miller’s source, on charges that he lied to the
grand jury and investigators about his part in “outing” Mrs.
329
Wilson.
His trial began in late January 2007 with a number of
330
reporters on the witness list.
Neither Taricani’s nor Miller’s case would have been good
candidates for getting the Supreme Court to consider recognizing
a federal common-law journalist’s privilege. As the First Circuit
331
noted in rejecting Taricani’s appeal of his contempt holding, a
special prosecutor investigating a possible crime (criminal
contempt, in this case) is very much like a grand jury, so Branzburg
332
was directly on point in rejecting the existence of a privilege.
Miller’s case was even more on point in comparison to Branzburg
because she was defying a grand jury subpoena in regard to an
investigation of specific criminal activity, as the U.S. Court of
333
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted.
324. See Scott Shane, Private Spy and Public Spouse Live at Center of Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2005, at A1.
325. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2000).
326. See Liptak, supra note 15, at A1; Susan Schmidt, Post Source Reveals Identity
to Leak Probers, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2004, at A2; Jacques Steinberg, Threat of
Jailing Is Lifted with Reporter’s Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A16.
327. Johnston & Jehl, supra note 15, at A1.
328. Id.
329. Johnston & Stevenson, supra note 15, at A1.
330. Neil A. Lewis, Libby Trial to Display Changed Reporter-Source Relations, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at A16.
331. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004).
332. Id. at 44–45.
333. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir.
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A more promising case for a consideration of whether a
common-law privilege exists might have been in the Wen Ho Lee
Case. Six reporters from various news organizations were held in
contempt of court by district judges for refusing to give depositions
naming confidential sources to Dr. Lee. Five of the reporters failed
to comply with an order to give depositions regarding their
confidential government sources for stories linking Dr. Lee to
espionage and were ordered to pay $500 a day until they
334
complied.
The judge, however, stayed imposition of the fines
335
In June 2005, the
until the reporters had a chance to appeal.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the
appeals of four of the five reporters: Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles
Times, H. Josef Hebert of the Associated Press, James Risen of the
336
New York Times, and Pierre Thomas of ABC, formerly of CNN.
The appellate panel determined that Lee had exhausted
reasonable alternative sources when he deposed twenty people
working for the Energy Department, Justice Department, and
337
FBI.
The appellate court, however, said the district court had
insufficient evidence to find one of the five reporters, Jeff Gerth of
the New York Times, in contempt because he apparently had no
338
information that would be helpful to Lee. In November 2005 the
full appellate court declined to rehear the case en banc on a 4–4
339
vote, with two judges not participating.
The sixth reporter, Walter Pincus of the Washington Post, who
was subpoenaed later than the other reporters and also refused to
answer deposition questions, was found in civil contempt of court
340
in November 2005.
In an unusual twist, Judge Rosemary M.
Collyer ordered Pincus to contact all of his confidential sources for
the Lee stories and inform them of her decision so that they could
have the opportunity to release him from his pledges of
341
confidentiality.
Pincus responded by asking the judge to
2005). Specifically, the court explained that “there is no material factual
distinction between the petitions before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the
appeals before us today.” Id.
334. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 347 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004).
335. Id. at 33.
336. Wen Ho Lee. v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir 2005).
337. Id. at 60.
338. Id. at 64.
339. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
340. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005).
341. Id. at 144.
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342

reconsider her order.
The Wen Ho Lee case involved a civil action, which does not
raise the type of constitutional or public policy issues that
343
subpoenas related to criminal trials or grand juries raise.
Also,
unlike the Taricani case, which involved a leak of evidence in a
pending criminal case, and the Miller case, which involved a leak
that could have been a federal crime in itself, the Wen Ho Lee case
involved reporting about matters of more serious public concern,
including possible espionage. Judge David Tatel of the D.C.
Circuit, dissenting from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc,
said it was “hard to imagine” how Dr. Lee’s private interest in
pursuing litigation “could outweigh the public’s interest in
protecting journalists’ ability to report without reservation on
344
sensitive issues of national security.”
The Wen Ho Lee case also would have posed problems for
journalists asserting a common-law privilege. Judge Collyer’s
decision with regard to Walter Pincus, issued two weeks after the
D.C. Circuit’s denial of rehearing in regard to the other reporters,
specifically rejected the existence of a common-law privilege
distinct from any First Amendment privilege that might exist in the
345
circuit.
Judge Collyer noted that Judge Tatel had proposed a
346
The
three-part balancing test when reporters were subpoenaed.
test would require the party issuing the subpoena to prove
relevance of the material sought, exhaustion of other sources for
the information, and that the public interest in protecting the
source was outweighed by the interest in disclosing the
347
information. Judge Collyer suggested that the first two prongs of
the test—relevance and exhaustion—were the same as the First
348
The third prong,
Amendment test already used in the circuit.
the weighing of interests, would raise “very troubling” issues
342. Charles Lane, Post Reporter Asks Judge to Rethink Order, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2005, at A2.
343. For a discussion of the journalist’s privilege with regard to criminal
proceedings, see Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An
Analysis of United States Court of Appeals Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1441 (2002).
344. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d at 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
345. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 138–39 (D.D.C
2005).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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because it would require judges to determine newsworthiness, she
349
wrote.
Judge Collyer also argued that Jaffee would not favor a ruling
for Pincus on the question of whether a common-law journalist’s
privilege existed. The judge noted that the Supreme Court in Jaffee
found that the confidential relationship between psychotherapists
and patients was central to encouraging the frankness that went to
the heart of successful therapy and therefore served a “public good
350
of transcendent importance.” The judge said keeping a source’s
identity confidential was only a useful tool for a journalist, not a
right of “transcendent importance.” She found, therefore, that
351
Jaffee was not analogous to Pincus’s situation.
Finally—and, perhaps, predictably—Judge Collyer found that
recognizing a common-law privilege would require a court to
determine who could claim protection under the privilege. “The
proliferation of communications media in the modern world
352
Reporters,
makes it impossible” to define “reporter,” she wrote.
she noted, do not have special courses of study, are not licensed,
353
and are not subject to organized oversight or discipline. They are
354
not, in other words, anything like the psychotherapists in Jaffee.
Judge Collyer conceded that she might be putting the “horse
behind the cart” in her concern for the definitional problems that
recognizing a common-law privilege might entail, given that Pincus
355
clearly would fit any definition of “reporter.”
She added,
however, that answering the question of whether a privilege should
be recognized would necessarily involve answering the question of
356
whom it would protect.
The two questions “are two sides of the
same coin: the first cannot be answered without attention to the
357
second.”
Judge Collyer’s concern is reasonable, and it is not the only
one that would have made the Wen Ho Lee case problematic for
journalists if they had succeeded in getting the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari and consider recognizing a common-law
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 140 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996)).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140 n.23.
Id.
Id.
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journalist’s privilege. As the 4–4 vote on rehearing the first Wen Ho
Lee subpoena case demonstrates, the D.C. Circuit is divided on
whether any such privilege already exists. This division was also
evident in the three-judge panel’s decision in the same circuit to
358
Although all three judges agreed
reject Judith Miller’s appeal.
that the government had overcome any journalist’s privilege that
might exist, all three wrote separate concurring opinions to point
out their differences with each other. One judge argued that
359
Branzburg
not only rejected a constitutional privilege but a
360
Judge Tatel disagreed that
common-law privilege as well.
Branzburg foreclosed any common-law privilege and suggested that
the fact that most states had adopted a privilege argued in favor of
361
common-law recognition.
The third judge believed that there
might be a common-law privilege, but also believed that it was
unwise to explore the issue when it was unnecessary to decide the
362
case at hand.
Given the wide variation in opinion among judges on the
District of Columbia appellate and district courts, both Lee and the
subpoenaed reporters could have found ample ammunition for
their sides had the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Different
problems would have arisen if the Court had taken the Miller case
363
or New York Times Co. v. Gonzales or if it agrees to take one of the
more recent cases. Miller’s case, the New York Times case, the
364
BALCO grand jury case, and a case involving a freelance video
365
journalist all involve grand jury investigations. Recognizing a
constitutional or common-law privilege in any of these cases would
require the Supreme Court to overturn its own precedent in
Branzburg. Although journalists have tried in the last few years to
argue that Branzburg did not foreclose the recognition of a
journalist’s privilege in all grand jury subpoena cases, judges have
by and large disagreed. For example, two reporters who fought
subpoenas in the Valerie Plame Wilson investigation lost in their
attempt to quash the subpoenas when they could not overcome
358. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
359. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
360. Id. at 977 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
361. Id. at 986–87 (Tatel, J., concurring).
362. Id. at 981–86 (Henderson, J., concurring).
363. 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006), stay denied, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006)
364. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
365. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, No. 06-16403, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23315 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006).
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what the judge called the “inevitable holding” in Branzburg that
reporters could not escape grand jury subpoenas without a showing
366
of bad faith or harassment.
Other courts examining the
precedent in grand jury subpoena cases recently likewise have
found that Branzburg created an “inevitable” situation for the
367
reporters seeking to quash subpoenas.
Let us suppose for a moment that the Supreme Court did
agree to hear a journalist’s privilege case, either an appeal from
one of the current cases or an appeal in a case that has not yet
come to light. Suppose also that the Court did not feel, in the light
of FRE 501’s passage after the Branzburg decision, that it was
necessarily bound by Branzburg’s “inevitable holding.” What would
most likely happen?
If the Court conducted a Jaffee-like inquiry, journalists likely
would argue that there are strong public policy arguments favoring
the privilege. They would not have to look far to find such
arguments. In his Branzburg dissent, Justice Stewart laid out a
strong argument favoring a privilege when he noted that reporters
often needed to use confidential sources to gather news and
368
facilitate the free flow of information to the public. Similarly, the
Washington Supreme Court examined the factors favoring a
common-law privilege and determined that it was essential in a
complex day and age in which people relied on the press to inform
369
them about important matters of public concern. The journalists
also would note that the journalist’s privilege, like the
psychotherapist privilege at issue in Jaffee, has been recognized by
most states either through statute, constitutional interpretation, or
370
common-law interpretation.
The party or parties seeking to compel journalists’ testimony
(for this hypothetical, let us assume it is the government) likely

366. In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004).
The reporters, Tim Russert of NBC and Matthew Cooper of Time magazine, later
testified to the grand jury after their sources released them from their promises of
confidentiality. See Steinberg, supra note 326, at A2. Cooper, however, was later
subpoenaed again and was expected to go to jail on the same day as Miller until
his second source released him from a confidentiality promise on the day Miller
was sentenced. See Liptak, supra note 15, at A1.
367. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23315, at *4.
368. See supra text accompanying note 42.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 71–79.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 55–81.
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would argue, along the lines of Judge Collyer in the Pincus case,
that the privilege is a “useful tool” but not a necessity for
journalists. The government would rely heavily on Branzburg and
the concerns expressed there about burdens on lower courts and
372
favoring journalists in a way that other citizens are not favored.
Depending upon the facts of the case, the government might be
able to make a compelling argument that the public interest would
be better served by forcing the journalists to reveal their sources,
particularly if a national security issue were involved. At the least,
the government would note language in Branzburg suggesting that
the public’s need for “every person’s evidence” is a strong
counterpoint to any journalist’s argument that she should be
373
excused from testifying before a grand jury.
The government
likely would note that a journalist’s privilege was not among the
privileges listed by the committee whose work led to the creation of
374
FRE 501.
The government also would invite the Court to
consider Justice Scalia’s argument in his Jaffee dissent that state
statutory creation of privileges was a strong rationale for a federal
375
statute, but not a common-law privilege created by judges.
How the Court would decide is anyone’s guess. The facts of
the particular case before it would be heavy factors in determining
the outcome. In a best-case scenario for journalists, the Court
might declare that FRE 501’s adoption had changed the privilege
landscape since Branzburg and find that a journalist’s privilege
existed in federal common law. The Court would be unlikely to go
as far as it did in Jaffee and create an almost unqualified privilege,
however, given that none of the federal circuits nor most of the
376
states have adopted absolute privileges.
The Court likely would
borrow the language from Justice Stewart’s Branzburg dissent and
require a showing, before a journalist could be compelled to reveal
a source, that the information is critical to the underlying case,
377
Although the
relevant to the case, and unavailable elsewhere.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 350–351.
372. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33.
373. See supra text accompanying note 33.
374. See supra text accompanying note 300.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 306–307.
376. Among states with statutory privileges, for example, only a handful fail to
qualify the privilege in some way in statutory language, and, even in those states,
courts often have added qualifiers in specific circumstances. For a more detailed
discussion, see Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential
Information in States With Shield Laws, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 325, 342–49 (1999).
377. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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Court was reluctant to add exceptions to the privilege it recognized
in Jaffee, the Court in our hypothetical might add exceptions for
cases in which the journalist’s testimony was critical to a matter of
national security or cases in which the journalist witnessed the
commission of a crime by the source. The Court might also accept
Judge Tatel’s invitation to add a fourth prong to the Stewart test
and require that journalists show in individual cases that the
privilege would serve some sort of public interest outweighing the
378
public interest in revealing the source’s identity.
Of course, the worst-case scenario is that the Court would
refuse to recognize a privilege and would clarify its Branzburg
holding to find that neither the First Amendment nor the common
law supported such a privilege. This would be troublesome
because it likely would lead the federal appellate circuits that have
recognized a qualified privilege to reverse themselves in future
cases and deny the privilege. Much would depend upon whether
the Court limited its holding to grand juries or determined that no
privilege existed in any federal proceeding.
Ultimately, the success or failure of journalists’ attempts to get
a common-law privilege recognized by the Supreme Court would
come down to persuading the Court to abandon its trepidation
about identifying a class of persons called “journalists.” It would be
nearly impossible for the Court to ignore an argument similar to
Judge Collyer’s that the “proliferation of communications media in
the modern world” would make it difficult, if not impossible, to
379
define such a class of persons.
Already, California courts have
had to determine whether publishers of online magazines, or
380
“e-zines,” could claim protection under that state’s shield statute.
Judge Sentelle’s concurring opinion in the Judith Miller case also
noted the possibility that courts would have a nearly impossible task
in determining whether someone is a journalist given the rise of
381
Journalists could
blogs and other new communication media.

378. See supra text accompanying note 344.
379. See supra text accompanying note 352.
380. See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (finding that online magazine publishers qualify for shield law protection
under California law).
381. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“Perhaps more to the point today, does the
privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical “blogger”
sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web his
best product to inform whoever happens to browse his way? If not, why not?”).
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counter that the federal circuits already have come up with a
definition by determining that journalists are persons engaged in
investigative reporting who had the intent, at the time information
382
was gathered, of disseminating it to the public.
Whether the
Court would find that definition acceptable, too broad, or too
narrow is open to conjecture.
The question remains whether journalists should even try to
persuade the Supreme Court to create a common-law privilege,
given the worst-case scenario might wipe out the tenuous
protection journalists have in federal courts now. The answer is a
qualified yes. The Court is more likely to limit its holding to
whatever facts are before it, so the worst-case scenario appears
unlikely. If a journalist or journalists take a grand jury subpoena
case to the Court and it accepts, the Court is most likely to simply
clarify its Branzburg holding. Journalists might have a greater
chance of success if the case involves information subpoenaed in a
civil case in which the journalist and her employer are not parties.
A civil case does not raise the important public policy or Sixth
Amendment issues that exist in a criminal trial, nor does it run up
against the “inevitable holding” of Branzburg in grand jury
383
subpoena cases.
Ironically, and somewhat perversely, the worst-case scenario
might actually make it easier to get a statutory privilege passed in
Congress. If journalists were stripped of whatever protection they
have left in federal jurisdictions, this might persuade reluctant
members of Congress that it is time to act.
Several versions of a shield statute were introduced in the
109th Congress and provided some clues as to what type of
language might emerge should senators and representatives
introduce new versions of the bills in the 110th Congress, which
382. See supra text accompanying note 298.
383. A recent ruling in a federal district court in Virginia would be a bad
candidate for the Supreme Court because it involves a libel suit against the media.
The New York Times was ordered to identify confidential sources used by columnist
Nicholas D. Kristof in columns that allegedly defamed Steven J. Hatfill, a former
scientist suspected of sending anthrax to a number of people in 2002. See Jerry
Markon, New York Times Columnist Must Reveal Sources, Judge Rules, WASH. POST,
Oct. 24, 2006, at B3. A case in which the news organization is a party and
attempting to keep information from a libel plaintiff is unlikely to elicit much
sympathy for the news organization. See, e.g., Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst.,
822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005) (upholding default judgments against newspaper
and reporter for refusing to reveal confidential source to plaintiff in libel and
privacy action).
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384

seems likely.
Of the six shield bills under consideration in the
House and Senate during the 109th Congress, five of them shared
sponsors or language. Senator Christopher Dodd, Democrat of
Connecticut, introduced Senate Bill 369 (S. 369) in February 2005.
Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, was the sponsor of
Senate Bill 1419, which was identical to Representative Mike
385
Pence’s House of Representatives Bill 3323 (H.R. 3323). Senator
Lugar later introduced a new version, Senate Bill 2831 (S. 2831),
but Representative Pence did not join him this time. Given that S.
2831 was the most recent version of Senator Lugar’s proposal and
386
S. 369 went nowhere, it probably is necessary only to discuss S.
2831 and H.R. 3323.
The Lugar bill, S. 2831, would have created a qualified
privilege for confidential source identities or confidential
information subpoenaed by the government in criminal
387
investigations. Disclosure could be compelled upon a showing by
the government that the information was critical to an investigation
or prosecution, relevant to the proceeding, unavailable elsewhere,
and that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public
388
interest in nondisclosure.
Similar conditions on the privilege
would apply when a journalist was subpoenaed by a criminal
389
defendant or civil litigant.
The Lugar bill contained several
exceptions, including limitations on the privilege when the
journalist was an eyewitness to a crime or involved in criminal or
390
tortious activity; if the information was needed to prevent a death
391
or in cases involving national
or substantial bodily injury;
392
security.
S. 2831 would have defined a “journalist” for purposes of the
384. See Zachary Coile, Key Lawmakers Urge Justice Department to Rescind Subpoenas
of BALCO Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2007, at A1 (reporting that two members
of Congress had asked the Justice Department to withdraw its subpoenas of two
San Francisco Chronicle reporters and that they planned to use the case to back a
push for a federal shield law in the new Congress).
385. The Lugar and Pence bills were amended versions of earlier bills, Senate
Bill 340 and House of Representatives Bill 581, which also were identical to each
other.
386. Senator Dodd’s bill attracted only three co-sponsors. See THOMAS
(Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
387. Free Flow of Information Act, S. 2831, 109th Cong. § 4 (2006).
388. Id. § 4(b)(1)–(6).
389. Id. §§ 5–6.
390. Id. § 7.
391. Id. § 8.
392. Id. § 9.
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privilege as someone who was “engaged in gathering, preparing,
collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting,
or publishing news or information” for one of the traditional news
media, an Internet news service, or any other “professional medium
or agency which has as 1 of its regular functions the processing and
researching of news or information intended for dissemination to
393
the public.”
The Senate bill also would have required that the
covered person work for “gain or livelihood” as a salaried employee
394
or independent contractor for the news medium. The bill would
therefore have excluded hobbyist bloggers and volunteer
journalists unless their livelihood came from their journalistic
activities.
The Pence bill, H.R. 3323, would have given absolute
protection against disclosure of confidential sources unless the
information was needed in regard to a matter of national
395
security. With regard to unpublished material such as notes and
outtakes, the Pence bill would have provided qualified protection,
with the qualifications differing depending upon whether the
396
underlying case was criminal or civil.
The Pence bill only would
have limited the power of the executive and judicial branches to
397
subpoena journalists, not Congress.
The Pence bill defined a “covered person” as any entity that
“disseminates information by print, broadcast, cable, satellite,
mechanical, photographic, electronic, or other means” through
publishing a newspaper, book, magazine, or other periodical;
through operating a radio or television broadcast station or
network or cable system, satellite carrier, or providing
programming via radio, television, cable, or satellite; the parent
company of such an organization; or “an employee, contractor, or
other person who gathers, edits, photographs, records, prepares, or
398
disseminates news or information for such an entity.”
The bill
would have applied to any document created by the covered
“persons” in writings, recordings, and photographs, as the terms
399
are defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 1001.
If a bill similar to S. 2831 or H.R. 3323 passes in the 110th
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. § 3(3).
Id.
Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2005).
Id. § 2 (a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 5(4).
Id. § 5(2)(A)–(C).
Id. § 5(3).
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Congress, the effect would be similar to Supreme Court
recognition of a common-law privilege. A common-law privilege
would also define the scope of the coverage, the persons who could
claim its protection, and possibly any exceptions. The difference
would be that a statute would define the terms in relatively
concrete and intractable ways, while a common-law privilege would
allow flexibility. The flip side of the equation is that a shield statute
would provide more predictability for journalists, those who
attempt to subpoena them, and their sources than would a
common-law privilege that had to develop over time.
In short, there is no easy answer for the problem of how to
create a privilege for journalists that would protect them from
subpoenas in a consistent manner across all federal appellate
circuits. Assuming that Congress does not suddenly leap to the
defense of journalists by passing a shield statute in the early days of
the 110th Congress, there may be time for journalists to attempt
again to persuade the Supreme Court to recognize a common-law
privilege. Even if the Court refuses to do so, either by denying
certiorari or by ruling in line with Branzburg, the statutory privilege
option would still exist.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the outcomes in the Taricani, Miller, and Wen Ho Lee
cases, and the uneven protection for journalists shielding their
confidential sources among the federal appellate circuits, some sort
of privilege is needed to maintain the free flow of information and
journalists’ independence from government. Of the recent cases,
the Wen Ho Lee case might have been the most attractive vehicle for
taking the issue to the Supreme Court in hopes of getting
recognition for a common-law privilege that would bring
consistency to federal law. The problem of defining who would be
covered by such a privilege, however, would have made the case
difficult at best and could have resulted in an adverse ruling that
would have left reporters worse off than they are now. Another
possible solution would be to persuade Congress to pass some sort
of shield law that would serve the same purpose—consistency—
while leaving flexibility for the rapidly changing media landscape.
Given the nature of the bills introduced in the 109th Congress, this
also is not a perfect solution.
If a shield law does not pass in the 110th Congress, one of the
pending cases may make an attractive vehicle for getting the Court
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to recognize a common-law privilege if media attorneys can
persuade the Court to adopt a definition of “journalist” similar to
400
the one that some federal circuits have already adopted.
Whether the Court would find that reason and experience dictate
that it recognize such a privilege is anyone’s guess. If not, the
legislative alternative is still available to journalists. There may,
therefore, be nothing to lose in trying to persuade the Court that
its Jaffee reasoning would apply to journalists as well as psychiatric
social workers. It is a gamble, but no bigger gamble than the ones
that journalists and their sources take in the present legal climate
when journalists promise to keep source identities confidential.

400. As this article was being edited, two of the pending cases mentioned
earlier came to conclusions. In regard to the subpoenaing of two San Francisco
Chronicle reporters for their testimony about their source for secret grand jury
transcripts in connection with the BALCO steroids investigation, the source came
forward voluntarily, leading the government to drop subpoenas for the reporters.
Bob Egelko & John Koopman, Lawyer Enters Guilty Plea as BALCO Leaker;
Government Backs Off Reporters–They Avoid Prison Terms, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 2007,
at A1. In the other case, freelance videographer Josh Wolf, who served more time
in prison for defying a subpoena than any American journalist in history, agreed
to release disputed video footage of a San Francisco protest to a grand jury in
return for a promise that he would not have to testify or identify anyone on the
video. Bob Egelko & Jim Herron Zamora, The Josh Wolf Case: Blogger Freed After
Giving Video to Feds, S.F. CHRON., April 4, 2007, at B1.
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